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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Conventional disarmament on a regional scale

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 6 December 1991, the General Assembly adpted decision 46/412, entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale", in which the Assembly decided (a) to welcome the report of the Secretary-General on this question (A/46/333 and Corr.1 and Add.1); (b) to invite Member States that had not yet done so to convey to the Secretary-General their views on this matter; and (c) to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-seventh session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale".

2. Pursuant to paragraph (b) of the decision, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 26 February 1992, requested all Member States to communicate to him their views on this matter. To date, the Secretary-General has recieved replies from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Finland. Other replies will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

[Original: English]

[25 May 1992]

1. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which regards independence, peace and friendship as the basic idea of its foreign policy, attaches a particular importance to the disarmament issue.

2. The achievement of disarmament is conducive to easing tension and ensuring peace and security. It is, accordingly, important to implement conventional disarmament along with nuclear disarmament at the regional and global level.

3. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with a view to removing the danger of war and ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula, put forward a comprehensive disarmament proposal, the main contents of which are confidence-building between the north and south, reduction of armed forces of the north and south, conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and withdrawal of foreign forces from the peninsula.

4. It took unilateral measures of reducing its 100,000 armed forces and mobilizing more than 150,000 forces in the peaceful socialist construction as part of its efforts to create favourable circumstances for disarmament in the Korean peninsula.

5. The Agreement on the Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and South and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were adopted on 13 December 1991 and 20 January 1992, respectively, and both became effective on 19 February 1992.

6. The North-South Military Joint Committee was formed under the above north-south agreement and this Committee is now discussing disarmament issues, including the removal of weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of their offensive capacity, and practical verification measures to be followed.

7. The North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee was organized following the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and this Committee is also now discussing the issue of simultaneous inspection of nuclear facilities in the north and the United States nuclear weapons and bases in the south.

8. The North-South Military Joint Committee and the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, if they proceed successfully, will make it possible for the Korean peninsula to turn into a nuclear-free zone and promote the conventional disarmament on the Korean peninsula, which will contribute to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world.

9. In order to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, nuclear and conventional disarmament should be achieved in the region.

10. States that have deployed nuclear weapons and maintained large-scale military armaments in this region should take the lead in the disarmament process by agreeing to the following points:

(a) A guarantee should be given that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear-free zones;

(b) Nuclear weapons deployed on the land and sea of this region should be withdrawn to their own territories;

(c) Bilateral military treaties concluded with the States in this region should be abolished, their troops stationed in the region should be pulled out and their military bases dismantled.

11. The States in the region should take unilateral, bilateral and regional disarmament measures according to their own specific conditions and characteristics:

(a) Bilateral or regional disarmament agreements should be reached and implemented in good faith;

(b) Large-scale military manoeuvres that may endanger other States or regions should be refrained from;

(c) Any arms build-up or arms race should be stopped.

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[14 May 1992]

1. For Finland, as a European State, the experience gained in Europe is a natural point of departure in deliberations concerning regional disarmament.

2. Since the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm in 1986, the military negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have continued to produce tangible results. An impressive package of future-oriented confidence- and security-building measures was recently agreed upon in Vienna.

3. The contours of new negotiations on military security in Europe have begun to take shape. The Paris Summit in November 1990 decided that the work towards ensuring military security among the CSCE participating States would continue after the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. This new European security forum will be open to all CSCE participating States. Arms-control negotiations affecting the CSCE area will finally come under one and the same roof.

4. The new security forum will build upon the earlier achievements. This is another reason why the commitments already agreed upon must be scrupulously implemented. Finland expects that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), rightly described as the cornerstone of European security, will be ratified and enter into force soon. The CFE Treaty, the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Vienna document of 1992 and the Open Skies Treaty lay a sound basis for the new negotiations provided that the commitments contained in them are strictly respected and put into effect.

5. There are both incentives and scope for further steps in conflict-prevention and crisis-management as well as confidence-building and arms reduction in the new CSCE.

6. From Finland's point of view, it is important that reductions of armed forces are extended to our neighbouring regions in the northern parts of Europe. Therefore, we would like to see the future CSCE negotiations put special emphasis on a subregional approach in the European arena.

7. The capabilities of the immense arsenal of treaty-limited equipment and other weapons that will remain in Europe even after the implementation of the CFE commitments far exceed the requirements of security and stability. The CFE Treaty will play a key role in European security as a whole. However, deep cuts in conventional forces in Central Europe mandated by the CFE Treaty are not being matched by corresponding reductions in northern Europe.

8. We would like to see measures that entail reductions of military forces in our subregion as well as further constraints on their activities. There are specific issues concerning land, air and naval forces and activities that need to be addressed jointly by countries having security concerns in their own subregion. In addition to the measures that will be applied between all participating States, measures concerning border areas, enhanced transparency between neighbouring States, or groups of States in the same subregion, would have a positive impact on security in that particular subregion. This would be fully in accordance with the interests of the rest of Europe provided that such subregional negotiations are conducted in an open-ended manner and as an integral part of the broader CSCE framework.